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Institutional proximity and the size and geography of FDI spillovers: do 
European firms generate more favourable productivity spillovers in the 
EU neighbourhood? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The EU association framework provides European businesses with an entry advantage 
into the associated countries by facilitating production links and encouraging 
institutional convergence. It is believed that this has multiple beneficial effects for the 
associated countries, including ones related to productivity spillovers accruing to 
domestic firms. However, no empirical evidence exists to show that the presence of 
European firms produces larger productivity spillovers in recipient economies 
compared to firms from other world regions. We examine this question using firm-
level data covering 28 transition countries over the period 2002-2009. We estimate the 
intra-industry productivity effects of foreign ownership and examine how these differ 
across regional blocks (CEE, SEE and ENP), by origin of investor (EU15 versus non-
EU15), across geographical scales (national versus regional) and for different types of 
locations (capital-city regions versus the rest). Our results suggest that investments of 
EU origin play a distinctive role, helping raise domestic productivity in the associated 
countries unlike investments from outside the EU. However, this process operates in a 
spatially selective manner, potentially enhancing regional disparities and spatial 
imbalances. This assigns a particular responsibility for EU policy to devise interventions 
that will help redress these problems within its existing association framework. 
 
Keywords: EU neighbourhood; FDI spillovers; institutional proximity; regional 
disparities 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The successful experience of accession conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) led the EU to establish a similar framework for pre-accession and ‘approximation’ 
for countries in its wider periphery (Phinnemore, 2003; Emerson, 2004). In the Balkans 
(SEE), a framework of ‘extended conditionality’ was established through the 
Stabilisation and Association process (Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2010); in the eastern 
neighbourhood (as well as in the South Mediterranean), the EU established the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), offering preferential economic and political 
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relations, but no explicit prospect of accession, conditional on the recipient countries’ 
adherence to a set of association principles (Witman and Wolff, 2010). 
These processes aim at eliciting democratisation and socio-economic development in 
the associated countries, through institutional harmonisation/convergence and 
economic integration with the EU (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008). 
The latter is thought to create significant economic benefits for the associated 
countries, relating both to preferential access to EU markets (scale economies and 
market size effects linked to trade liberalisation) and to the inflow of, mainly 
European, capital and technology (capital deepening, demonstration effects and 
productivity spillovers). But although the beneficial effects of trade liberalisation are 
largely uncontested in the literature (for a critical view see Petrakos et al, 2013), the 
literature on the productivity spillovers of foreign-firm presence, especially those 
accruing within-sectors (intra-industry spillovers), often finds that these are minimal – 
or even negative – and in any case conditional on a number of firm-, country- and 
sector-specific factors (Konings, 2001; Damijan et al, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Sabirianova 
et al, 2005; Gorodnichenko et al, 2007; Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Damijan et al, 2013).  
One factor that has only recently started to be systematically examined in the 
literature concerns the links tying together sending and receiving countries – i.e., 
various forms of sender-recipient proximity. As we discuss in the next section, a 
number of studies have utilised information on the country of origin of the foreign 
firms to examine the role of factors such as geographical, technological or cultural 
proximity. However, no study to date in this literature has investigated specifically links 
that have to do with institutional proximity. Thus, for what concerns this paper, there 
is no prior knowledge to inform whether the institutional isomorphism pursued by the 
EU association policies has an effect on the size (and sign) of foreign-ownership 
productivity spillovers.  
Intuitively, institutional approximation between the EU and the associated countries 
may contribute to reducing entry and transaction costs for EU firms operating in these 
countries. If so, it is reasonable to expect that EU-originating investments in these 
countries will be less speculative and of a more long-term strategic character vis-à-vis 
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investments from other parts of the world, thus plausibly having a more positive 
impact on the receiving economies. Indeed, studies concerning the CEE accession 
countries have shown that the prospect of accession was paramount in mobilising 
foreign investments, as western firms responded to the opportunities offered by the 
opening of the new markets by changing the geographical organisation of their 
production thus instigating a wider process of restructuring for the European industry 
(Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Monastiriotis and Agiomirgianakis, 2009; Crescenzi et 
al, 2014). In a sense, these movements were part of a deeper integration process, 
reflecting the significant linkages that developed on the ground, which in turn 
facilitated sizeable technology transfers to CEE countries. In contrast, in the countries 
of the wider neighbourhood where the prospect of accession was feebler, this process 
was less intense and partly driven by different motives (Estrin and Uvalic, 2013; Ascani 
et al, 2013) – with volumes of FDI being significantly lower and more of the market-
capture type.  
In this paper we set out and examine empirically a set of hypotheses linked to these 
issues. We anticipate that institutional approximation is linked to stronger and more 
organic production linkages and thus that EU-originating investments will be 
associated with larger (more positive or less negative) productivity spillovers (vis-à-vis 
investments from non-EU firms), especially so in the countries with which the EU has 
closer institutional ties. To examine these hypotheses we use firm-level data for the 
period 2002-2009 covering 28 transition countries. We split these countries into three 
groups that correspond to the processes of membership (CEE), candidacy (SEE) and 
neighbourliness (ENP). We apply a simple production-function approach to estimate 
the intra-industry productivity spillovers accruing to domestic firms by foreign 
presence and examine how these spillovers vary (a) for groups of countries belonging 
to different processes with respect to EU association and (b) separately for 
investments of EU15 and non-EU15 origin.1 As spillovers are found to be of variable 
sizes along these dimensions at the national level (within sectors), we further 
                                                          
1
 EU15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK. In the text we use the terms ‘EU15’ and 
‘European’ interchangeably, but the reader should note that firms originating from the countries that 
acceded to the EU from 2004 onwards are treated here as ‘non-European’.  
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investigate the localisation of these spillovers by examining how their intensity varies 
at different geographical scales (national – regional) and for different types of 
locations (capitals versus the rest). This allows us, in addition, to examine the 
distributional consequences (across space) of foreign investments, thus informing 
about possible issues that may emerge in relation to policies aiming at fostering 
deeper economic links and institutional convergence between the EU and its 
neighbourhood.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces in 
more detail our research questions, also discussing some theoretical considerations 
and reviewing parts of the literature that are relevant for the motivation of our 
analysis. Section 3 gives details about our data and method, while section 4 presents 
our empirical results. The last section concludes with a discussion of the policy 
implications of our findings.  
 
2. Considerations for the analysis 
The literature on the productivity spillovers of foreign-firm presence in transition 
countries has shown that, generally, vertical spillovers (through backward and forward 
linkages to the sector of foreign presence) are positive and often sizeable, but that 
horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers are typically negative. The latter become positive 
only conditional on a number of intervening factors, such as firm size, sector and 
location; absorptive capacity and technological distance; national level of development 
and extent of corruption; and the extent and type of foreign ownership.2 While 
acknowledging the importance of these factors, our focus in this paper is with the role 
of institutional proximity and the geography of intra-industry spillovers. This, in turn, 
relates to two issues in the relevant literature: the role of the origin of foreign 
investments; and the localisation and regional differentiation of spillovers. 
                                                          
2
 See, inter-alia, Javorcik (2004), Sabirianova et al (2005), Gorodnichenko et al (2007), Nicolini and 
Resmini (2010), Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011), Farole and Winkler (2012) and Damijan et al (2013). 
See also Jordaan (2005) and Meyer and Sinani (2009) for similar evidence for developing countries 
outside the transition world.   
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i. Origin of foreign investment 
As mentioned already, the literature has only recently started paying systematic 
attention to the issue of ‘origin’. In an early examination of the issue, Gorodnichenko 
et al (2007) examined the impact of foreign presence in 17 emerging economies 
separately for firms originating from OECD and non-OECD countries. Their finding, that 
the impact is if anything stronger for non-OECD investments, led them to suggest that 
technological proximity (rather than a “high level of technology”) may be important in 
generating positive productivity spillovers. Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011) provide 
evidence consistent with this, in their study of Greek versus other European and non-
European FDI in Bulgaria. Focusing on the case of intra-industry spillovers, the authors 
argue that technological proximity makes spillovers easier to absorb by domestic firms 
thus increasing the estimated productivity effects. Additionally, however, they argue 
that cultural proximity is also important as culturally ‘proximate’ foreign investors have 
a greater advantage in drawing on local knowledge and thus benefit more by engaging 
more systematically with the local economy. This, too, creates a greater scope for 
spillovers to local firms.  
The role of cultural and technological proximity has also been emphasised by two 
earlier studies by Buckley et al (2007) and Abraham et al (2010), both on the case of 
China. Both studies found stronger productivity spillovers for firms originating from 
Chinese-speaking countries (Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan), a result which they 
interpret as, on the one hand, showing how “cultural and linguistic connection […] 
promotes the diffusion of technological know-how” and, on the other hand, reflecting 
the fact that firms from these countries tend to concentrate on “relatively simple, 
labour-intensive activities [with] low degrees of technological sophistication” which 
create more absorbable spillovers (Abraham et al, 2010, p.148).  
A different argument has been made by Javorcik and Spatareanou (2011). The authors 
focus on the issue of geographical proximity and provide evidence suggesting that 
foreign investors originating from more distant locations are associated with greater 
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spillovers (for the case of vertical spillovers in particular). They attribute this to the fact 
that short-distance investments allow foreign firms to maintain their links with 
established suppliers from their home countries thus lowering their propensity to use 
local resources and local supply chains. This result is at least partly consistent with the 
finding of Girma and Wakelin (2000) for the case of the UK, who find that local 
spillovers from Japanese firms are significantly stronger than spillovers from firms of 
North American and West European origin. A few other studies have looked at the 
issue of origin not in relation to questions of proximity, but as an issue of composition. 
For example, Zhang et al (2010) have investigated, for the case of China, the role 
played by the concentration in a sector of firms of different country-origins. They 
found that diversity of country-origins has a positive effect, increasing the size of intra-
industry productivity spillovers.  
As noted earlier, our interest in this paper is not with the wider issue of ‘origin’ but 
specifically with the issue of proximity. Our conceptualisation of proximity, however, 
deviates from that used in previous studies (technological, cultural or geographical 
proximity) as it focuses on the notion of institutional approximation. Specifically, we 
hypothesise that the process of EU approximation (be it in the context of accession – 
CEE; of pre-accession conditionality – SEE; or of neighbourliness – ENP) creates an 
institutional proximity that is associated with greater productivity spillovers emanating 
from EU-owned firms (vis-à-vis non-EU firms). This is for a number of reasons. First, 
EU-originating investors are likely to see their investments as part of the association 
process and, in this sense, as part of a policy that aims at strengthening local capacities 
and integration with the EU. Thus, local links are encouraged and local synergies 
pursued. As is noted by Abraham et al (2010) for the case of China, local links and “a 
strong interest in developing long-term projects” are key ingredients for the diffusion 
of know-how and the realisation of productivity spillovers. Second, domestic producers 
may have similar perceptions about EU-originating investments and thus may be more 
inclined to cooperate and/or compete with these – resulting in more intensive 
processes of mimicking, learning and technology transfer. Third, the very process of 
association creates institutional convergence (e.g., transposition of legal frameworks 
and regulations in line with EU norms and rules – Freyburg et al, 2009), making it 
7 
 
easier and less costly for European firms to interact with the local economy and for 
local firms to interact and work with the European investors.  
Our hypothesis assigns particular significance to the depth of institutional-political 
relations between the EU and the foreign-investment receiving countries. In the CEE, 
where integration with the EU has been full, foreign-presence spillovers ought to be 
large. In countries that are still in their pre-accession stage, institutional approximation 
is less complete and thus spillovers ought to be smaller. For countries where 
association does not imply full institutional convergence, the 'spillover advantage' of 
EU-originating investments ought to be even smaller – but still distinctively larger than 
that associated to non-EU firms. To examine this, we treat the countries in each 
recipient region as one group and derive group-specific estimates of the productivity 
spillovers associated to the presence of foreign-owned firms – separately for European 
and non-European concentrations. As the size of the spillovers is known to also depend 
on the level of development of the recipient country (Meyer and  Sinani, 2009) – and 
given that levels of development differ systematically across our regional groups – in 
our analysis we also control for national differences (including in levels of 
development) by incorporating country-level time-variant fixed effects.  
 
ii. Localisation and regional differentiation of spillovers 
Although in most studies foreign-firm presence is measured at the national than the 
local level, the geographical dimension of foreign presence is an important one. 
Theoretically, geography may play a role for the size of foreign-ownership spillovers 
through two main channels.3 The first concerns the effects of spatial concentration on 
local production through knowledge spillovers, labour pooling and network-sharing 
(see Overman and Puga, 2010, for a discussion of this in the agglomeration economics 
                                                          
3
 There is a third channel that concerns the spatial diffusion of spillovers, i.e., the possibility that 
regional concentrations of foreign-owned firms may have productivity effects that are transmitted 
across space to other regions. Studies examining this issue (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Driffield and 
Hughes, 2003; Jordaan, 2008b; Monastiriotis and Jordaan, 2010) have found such spillovers to be 
sometimes sizeable, although always smaller than the localised spillovers and not always positive. The 
number of regions in our sample countries is not sufficient for a formal analysis of this issue, but we 
make some comments in relation to this towards the end of the paper.  
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literature; and Barrios et al, 2006, Jordaan, 2008a, and Marioti et al, 2010, for studies 
in relation to foreign firm ownership). According to this, co-location (proximity) allows 
domestic firms to raise their productivity by exploiting advantages related to the 
upgrading of workforce skills in the local economy (e.g., through training by foreign-
owned firms), day-to-day interaction with foreign firms (participation in common 
Chambers, information-sharing) and pecuniary spillovers (sharing common distribution 
networks etc). This suggests that many of the mechanisms that lead to positive 
spillovers operate at the local level and thus that positive spillovers are rather 
localised. In contrast, the channels via which foreign presence may have negative 
effects (e.g., market capture) are more likely to operate at wider scales (nationally). 
Thus, even if the overall (national-level) effect of foreign presence is negative, we 
should expect the concentration of foreign-owned firms in a sector within a region to 
produce more positive spillovers compared to concentration of foreign-owned firms in 
the sector nationally.  
The second channel concerns the capacities and characteristics of the recipient local 
economies and relates more to the spatial differentiation of spillovers. The argument 
here is that productivity spillovers from foreign investments will tend to differ across 
space. More developed regions (often, those of capital cities) are in general more 
extrovert and typically host larger agglomerations. In a way this means that they are 
already open to forces of (international) competition (and learning), more so than their 
national hinterlands. If so, the scope for benefits derived from the presence of foreign 
firms, both locally and nationally, may be more limited in metropolitan and high-
agglomeration areas.4 On the other hand, these areas will have a greater capacity to 
internalise spillovers and to withstand the additional competition from foreign 
investors (e.g., managing to maintain their market shares). They will also have a 
greater advantage in attracting foreign investments, thus also benefiting from possible 
threshold and agglomeration effects. To the extent that this is true, foreign firm 
presence will tend to offer a relative advantage to more developed regions and thus to 
exacerbate existing spatial disparities in the recipient countries.  
                                                          
4
 Inversely, more peripheral regions will have more to gain from the technological knowledge of foreign 
firms and perhaps may benefit more also from pecuniary spillovers.  
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Empirical studies on these issues are far and few between  in the relevant literature. 
Only a handful of studies examine the localisation of spillovers associated specifically 
to foreign-firm ownership, typically finding significantly localised spillovers (Girma and 
Wakelin, 2000, and Driffield and Hughes, 2003, for the UK; Mullen and Williams, 2007, 
for the USA; Jordaan, 2008a, for Mexico) – although evidence against this has also 
been offered (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Haskel et al, 2007). Conflicting results have 
also been obtained in the studies examining the regional differentiation of these 
spillovers. Driffield and Munday (2001; for the UK) and Sgrad (2001; for Hungary) give 
evidence of stronger spillovers in areas with larger agglomerations, higher levels of 
development and greater proximity to markets. In contrast, Monastiriotis and Jordaan 
(2010) have shown for the case of Greece that spillovers are maximised in areas with 
weaker agglomerations and lower levels of development.  
In our analysis we examine this dimension by estimating the productivity spillovers of 
foreign ownership separately for capital-city and non-capital-city regions. The two 
hypotheses that we test are the following: first, that spillovers are stronger and more 
positive when foreign presence is measured at the local than the national level; 
second, that they are larger for capital-city regions than for the rest.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
It is standard in the literature to examine foreign-ownership productivity spillovers 
using an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function in a two-stage approach. The 
first stage involves the derivation of a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) from a 
regression of output (log-sales) on employment, fixed assets and raw materials. Given 
concerns about the endogeneity of inputs to firm productivity (i.e., that firms may 
select how much to invest depending on their true productivity type), estimation in 
this first stage follows typically the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach, which introduces a 
third-order polynomial of capital and investment to proxy for unobserved productivity 
at the firm level. The derived TFP measure is then regressed at a second stage on the 
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sectoral share of foreign ownership (and other controls that may be deemed 
appropriate) using OLS.5  
It should be noted that although this two-stage approach is widely used in the 
literature on foreign-ownership spillovers, the reasons for doing so are not entirely 
clear. If present, the endogeneity bias can lead to inflated estimates on the 
production-function parameters and thus to an under-estimation of the TFP variable.6 
But the bias introduced on the derived estimates for the key variable of interest 
(foreign-share), which is measured at the sectoral level, will be minimal (or zero) if firm 
selection into high/low investment does not vary systematically across sectors; and will 
be sufficiently treated by the inclusion of sector-specific fixed effects, thus producing 
unbiased estimates of the foreign-ownership effect on domestic firm productivity, if 
selection varies systematically across sectors.7 
Driven by these considerations, in our empirical analysis we do not follow the two-
stage approach. Rather, we estimate directly a log-linearised augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production-function model which incorporates, in addition to the two main factors of 
production (capital and labour), the share of foreign presence in the sector where each 
firm is located and a set of additional controls for the different dimensions of the 
sample. Specifically,  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝐷𝑐 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡  (1) 
                                                          
5
 Few studies examine the issue of spillovers in an IV setting, where foreign-presence is instrumented as 
it is considered to be endogenous to sectoral characteristics, such as profitability, average productivity, 
etc – see Jordaan (2005 and 2009) for an application and discussion of this. In this paper we do not 
pursue this path, but we note that such endogeneity concerns are technically dampened by the 
inclusion in our estimations of sector-specific fixed-effects.  
6
 Assuming that high-productivity firms ‘select’ into high rates of investment. The opposite direction of 
bias is also possible, if for example low-productivity firms compensate for their low efficiency by making 
more extensive use of production inputs (extensive versus intensive production model).  
7
 Indeed, Olley and Pakes (1996) introduce their correction as a method to address bias in the 
estimation of firm-level, not higher-order, coefficients. Moreover, they emphasise that the bias is more 
important in contexts where there is “significant entry and exit and large changes in the sizes of 
incumbents” (p.1263), which is not necessarily the case across datasets. In addition, application of the 
Olley-Pakes correction requires good quality data on capital and investment. Existing gaps and reported 
inconsistencies across countries in the recording of information on capital investment in the BEEPS 
dataset make us question the validity of this condition in our data.  
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where y, k and l stand for the firm’s output (total sales), capital (fixed assets) and 
number of employees, all expressed in natural logarithms; F is the output share of 
foreign-owned activity; Dc, Ds and Dt are vectors of binary dummies for countries, 
sectors and years; and e is a normally distributed error. Eq.1 can be thought of as a 
reduced-form model of a two-equation system of the following form 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡(𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡
𝑏1 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡
𝑏2 )     (2a) 
ln⁡(𝑇𝐹𝑃)𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝐷𝑐 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡   (2b) 
where (1) is derived by log-linearising (2a) and then substituting ln(TFP) from (2b). The 
issue of selection aside, the equivalence between the two-equation and single-
equation models implies that the parameter b3 in (1) can be interpreted as the effect 
of foreign presence on firm’s i total factor productivity. In our estimating version of 
this equation, we use interacted fixed-effects for countries and years, in order to 
control for country differences in inflation rates as well as for possible problems in the 
conversion of the nominal local currency data into US dollars.8 Additionally, in parts of 
our analysis we extend (1) to also include a quadratic term of the foreign-share 
variable, in order to test the possible non-linearity of spillovers across different 
degrees of foreign-firm concentration, as has been identified in the literature (see, 
inter alia, Damijan et al, 2003, Merlevede and Schoors, 2007, and Monastiriotis and 
Alegria, 2011 for evidence of this in transition countries; and Barrios et al, 2005, 
Buckley et al, 2007, and Chen et al, 2011 for evidence from the wider literature). 
Because this variable is measured at the sectoral level, in all specifications we cluster 
the standard errors across sectors (and, where appropriate, sector-regions). 
A separate issue with this specification concerns the measurement of firm sales, given 
the absence of data on physical output volumes (Van Beveren, 2011). If pricing mark-
ups differ across sectors, for example due to differences in regulation or entry costs, it 
is possible that measured output will be inflated in some sectors relative to others. If 
the distribution of foreign presence is not independent to this, then the derived 
estimates for the foreign-share will be biased. We address this issue by including 
                                                          
8
 See Data Appendix. 
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sector-level fixed effects (DS) in all regressions. If, however, market power differs 
across firms within sectors, the inclusion of DS is not sufficient. The solution proposed 
in the literature for such a case (De Loecker, 2007) involves the estimation of a 
deflated revenue function which includes local-area (and sectoral) price deflators. In 
the absence of such price data for our sample countries, we were unable to apply this 
correction to our sales data. We note, however, that the effect this may have on our 
estimates of interest (on the foreign-share variable) is ambiguous and – unless 
patterns of firm-level market power correlate with the sectoral distribution of foreign 
ownership – intuitively minimal.  
Given our interest in this paper, equation (1) is further extended in three ways. First, 
we split the foreign-presence variable F into two separate variables measuring foreign-
presence by EU15 and non-EU15 countries, respectively (FEU, FNEU). Thus, our 
estimating model becomes 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏3
𝐸𝑈𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡
𝐸𝑈 + 𝑏3
𝑁𝐸𝑈𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑈 + (𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝐷𝑡) + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 (3) 
This model is estimated for the full-sample as well as separately for each of the three 
recipient regions (CEE, SEE and ENP). Second, we re-define our foreign-share variable 
at the regional level, so that F is allowed to vary across regions-sectors-years within 
each country (Frsct), in order to examine whether the effect of foreign presence is 
localised, i.e., whether concentration in the sector within each region produces more 
significant spillovers. Our estimating relationship becomes  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐3𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑡 + (𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝐷𝑡) + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡  (4) 
Third, we interact the nationwide foreign-share variable (Fsct) with a capital-region 
dummy (DR, taking the value of 1 if the firm is in a capital-city region and 0 otherwise), 
to test whether foreign presence has differentiated effects for different types of 
regions within each country (capital versus peripheral regions). We test this both for 
the national-sectoral and the regional-sectoral definition of the foreign-share variable: 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏4(𝐷𝑅𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡) + (𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝐷𝑡) + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 (5a) 
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𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐3𝐹𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐4(𝐷𝑅𝐹𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑡) + (𝐷𝑐 ∗ 𝐷𝑡) + 𝐷𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 (5b) 
 
All in all, our analysis examines the following four hypotheses: 
- H1: Productivity spillovers associated to EU15 firms are always larger, so that 
b3
EU>b3
NEU 
- H2: Productivity spillovers associated to EU15 firms are larger for countries 
with deeper forms of association with the EU, so that 𝑏3,𝐶𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝑈 > 𝑏3,𝑆𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝑈 > 𝑏3,𝐸𝑁𝑃
𝐸𝑈  
- H3: Productivity spillovers are localised so that b3<c3 
- H4: Productivity spillovers of all origins are larger in capital city regions, so that 
b4>0 and c4>0 
To examine these hypotheses we use data from the Panel II-IV version of the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). This is an unbalanced panel 
of individual firm-level data containing approximately 28,000 observations from 28 
transition countries over three waves covering the period 2002-2009. After cleaning 
the data and implementing various adjustments (see Data Appendix for details) we are 
left with 9,292 observations with data on sales, fixed-assets, number of employees, 
sector/region/country of operation, and nationality of ownership – which we use in 
our analysis.  
Our main independent variable – the share of foreign-owned production in the sector 
(‘foreign share’) – has been constructed using each individual firm’s reported share of 
foreign ownership and information on country, sector and yearly output of each firm. 
Firm-level output was first multiplied by each firm’s foreign-ownership share and 
aggregated to country-sector-year clusters. Our ‘foreign-share’ measure was then 
calculated as the ratio of this variable to total output in the cluster. The same approach 
was followed for the construction of our origin- and region- specific measures (e.g., 
foreign shares within region-sector-year clusters and foreign shares associated to 
ownership of EU15-origin only). We have favoured this output-based definition 
(following, e.g., Aitken and Harrison, 1999) against alternative measures (e.g., 
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employment shares of foreign-owned firms) because there are significant differences 
in labour productivity between foreign-owned and domestic firms in our sample and 
thus employment-share differences do not adequately reflect the importance of 
foreign presence in a sector. The regions used are the administrative regions in each 
country as reported in BEEPS (variable ‘a2’).  
To separate between foreign-owned and domestic firms (e.g., in our regression 
specifications), we have used a minimum threshold (>10%) definition. On this 
definition, foreign-owned firms in our sample comprise 23% of the total number of 
firms. Globally, the (unweighted) share of total sales accounted for by foreign 
ownership is 17.9% (of which 64% is of EU15 origin), ranging from 4.5% in Turkey to 
36.1% in Latvia. Concerning the European – non-European distinction (see Tables A.1 
and A.2 in the Appendix), the sectoral distributions of the two groups are not hugely 
different, but in relative terms EU15 firms seem to have stronger presence in Other 
services and lower in Electronics, IT, Retail trade, Basic metals, Chemicals and Textiles. 
In firms with foreign presence, the average (unweighted) share of foreign ownership is 
73.9% (80.9% for EU15-owned firms), ranging between 61.7% in Chemicals and 86.7% 
in Business services and between 56.7% in Turkey and 89.9% in Montenegro. As should 
be expected, country variations in the presence of EU15 (versus other) firms are larger. 
The EU15 share to total output accounted for by foreign presence is on average 
around 80% for countries in the CEE region (95% in Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
closer to 75% for most other cases), 70% in SEE (ranging from 55% in Bosnia to 81% in 
Albania), and 45% in the ENP (ranging from 17% in Kazakhstan to 70% in Tajikistan).  
 
4. Empirical results 
i. Spillovers and institutional proximity: analysis by origin and destination  
We start our analysis with the examination of the issue of origin-destination at the 
national level (using sector-wide foreign shares). Table 1 presents the results. As a 
benchmark, the first column tests the spillover effect of the overall foreign share (EU15 
plus non-EU15). Consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature (Javorcik, 2004; 
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Gorodnichenko et al, 2007; Damijan et al, 2013), this effect is negative, indicating that 
foreign presence reduces the productivity of domestic firms. To examine our first 
hypothesis (H1), in col.2 we split the foreign share variable into its EU15 and non-EU15 
components. The estimated effect of the non-EU15 variable is statistically significant 
now at 1% and over twice as large (more negative) as the benchmark estimate (col.1). 
In contrast, the effect of EU15 presence is only marginally negative and statistically not 
different from zero (p-value=0.971). Thus, in line with our expectations, the impact of 
EU15-originating investments is indeed distinctive: although we fail to find positive 
spillovers at this level, the difference in the two effects is unquestionable (and 
statistically significant at 1%, based on a Wald test for the equality of the two 
coefficients). This indicates clearly that European firms are if anything less destructive 
for domestic productivity than their non-European counterparts. As the model 
includes sector- and country-level fixed effects, we have to dismiss the possibility that 
this effect is driven by selectivity of EU15 firms into more productive sectors and/or 
countries, or indeed to countries with higher levels of development and higher 
absorptive capacity (Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Farole and Winkler, 2012).9  
 
------- INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE ------- 
 
It is possible, however, that the effect is driven by selectivity into country groups. As 
we showed in section 2, EU15 presence is significantly higher in the CEE region and 
lowest in the ENP. To test whether this differentiation may be driving the result of 
col.2, but also to examine directly our second hypothesis, about the role of 
institutional linkages for the size (and sign) of spillovers, in the remainder of Table 1 we 
split the sample into the three regional groups. In columns 3-5 we test the linear 
model analogous to col.2. Although the results show no statistical significance in any of 
                                                          
9
 Interestingly, the EU15 effect becomes positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.058) when we 
drop the country fixed-effects. This confirms the presence of some degree of geographical selectivity for 
EU15 firms (into countries with higher firm productivity), which our models in Table 1 successfully 
control for.  
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the sub-samples, they are nevertheless informative. In all regions, the EU15 effect is 
positive while that of non-EU15 is always negative. Importantly, the coefficients (and 
thus the difference between the EU15 and non-EU15 effects) become larger as we 
move to regions with looser association to the EU. Indeed, despite individual non-
significance, the difference between the EU15 and non-EU15 effects turns out 
statistically significant for the ENP group (F-statistic = 4.66, p-value = 0.045). So, 
although the differentiation in EU15 versus non-EU15 effect is maintained, our group-
specific estimates in this linear model reject our second hypothesis concerning 
institutional proximity: the EU15 effect is not larger in the CEE group vis-à-vis the SEE 
group and the latter is not larger vis-à-vis the ENP group – if anything, the opposite is 
true.  
We want to investigate this further, in order to examine whether statistical 
insignificance has to do with the fact that the impact of foreign presence on domestic 
firm productivity may be non-linear. As we discussed in section 2, evidence for this has 
been found in a number of studies (Damijan et al, 2003; Chen et al, 2011; Monastiriotis 
and Alegria, 2011). To do so, in columns 6-8 we introduce quadratic terms of the EU15 
and non-EU15 variables. The results from this exercise are mixed. For the non-EU15 
variable, the linear and quadratic terms are jointly significant in all three sub-samples, 
but they are individually significant only in the SEE group. For the EU15 variable, the 
results are also significant in the case of the SEE group, but not significant in the other 
two sub-samples. Another important difference emerges however: the EU15 effect 
tends everywhere to be hump-shaped; while the non-EU15 effect is U-shaped (convex) 
in the SEE and ENP samples and almost monotonically declining in the CEE sample.  
 
------- INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE ------- 
 
To demonstrate these differences more clearly, in Figure 1 we plot the predicted total 
effects of foreign ownership across all possible values of foreign-firm concentration by 
region of destination and region of origin. In the EU15 case (left panel), the effect is 
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increasing for low concentrations of European presence in all country groups. In the 
ENP region this effect is very flat and increases almost linearly with European 
concentration, but without ever obtaining any economic (let along statistical) 
significance. In the CEE region the effect is clearly hump-shaped, but again lacks any 
economic or statistical significance, reaching a maximum value (0.047) at foreign-
ownership concentrations of 31% and turning negative for concentrations above 62%. 
In the SEE region the effect is similar (maximum at 32%, turning negative at 65%) but it 
is much more strongly concave and positive (maximum value of 0.147) and, as noted, 
also significant statistically. Concerning the spillovers associated to non-EU15 
ownership (right panel), the effect in the CEE region is maximised at concentrations of 
9% and turns quickly negative (concentrations above 19%), reaching very negative 
values (over -0.15) for concentrations above 60%. For the ENP region the effect is 
always negative and reaches very negative values much earlier (e.g., -0.15 for 
concentrations above 30% and -0.25 for concentrations over 60%). For the SEE region, 
the effect is also always negative (concentrations above 70%, when this effect turns 
positive, concern only 7 out of the 2,254 observations in this sub-sample) and reaches 
its lowest value (-0.276) at concentrations near 37%.  
From this evidence, it seems that firms in the SEE region benefit the most from 
European presence and suffer the most from the presence of non-EU15 firms; while 
for firms in the ENP region the effect of EU15 presence is also more advantageous (vis-
à-vis the presence of non-EU15 firms) although statistical significance here is not 
strong. These results seem to lend more support to our second hypothesis about the 
differentiation of the EU15 effect across groups of countries with different degrees of 
institutional proximity. However, the results found for the CEE sample do not fit this 
picture: although the EU15 effect is positive numerically, it is never significant 
statistically and always smaller than in the SEE and ENP regions.  
If we were to assume, on the weight of the other results, that the hypothesis 
concerning institutional proximity is valid, one possible explanation for the different 
behaviour of the CEE sample may be that, as the countries in the region received 
European investments much earlier and have by now become fully integrated into the 
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EU, the initial benefits from foreign presence may have subsided or indeed been 
exhausted. This however would seem to contradict standard findings in the literature 
suggesting that the productivity gains from foreign presence are stronger in the case of 
more developed countries where domestic firms have higher absorptive capacity 
(Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Zhang et al, 2010; Farole and Winkler, 2012). Be it as it may, 
it should be noted that when dropping the country fixed effects from our estimations 
(results not shown but available upon request), the EU15 effect in the CEE region 
becomes much more positive and significant at 5%, with a maximum total effect (at 
concentrations of EU15 near 44%) that is noticeably bigger than that found in the SEE 
sample (0.338 versus 0.147).  
On the whole, then, our investigation of the first two hypotheses provides positive, but 
not overwhelming, evidence in favour of the hypothesised role of institutional 
proximity. European ownership has been found consistently to be more advantageous 
for domestic firm productivity than non-EU15 ownership. Although the estimated 
effect for the CEE region does not fully conform to this pattern, the effects of EU15 
presence are notably stronger in the SEE region, which has longer and deeper 
institutional ties with the EU than in the ENP region where institutional proximity is 
much weaker.  
 
ii. Geography and localisation of spillovers 
Notwithstanding the findings about the distinctive role of EU15 ownership, our overall 
results suggest that foreign presence has rather limited intra-industry effects. In this 
sub-section we examine whether this is due to issues that have to do with 
geographical scale – examining specifically whether spillovers are (a) localised (i.e., if 
they are stronger for sectoral concentrations of foreign ownership within regions – H3) 
and (b) different across space and in particular across regions of different 
agglomeration and development (as proxied by the distinction between capital-city 
regions versus the rest – H4). We address these issues in the regressions presented in 
Table 2.  
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As can be seen, defining the presence of foreign ownership at the regional level makes 
a noticeable difference in the obtained results, in line with our expectations and 
consistent with the balance of evidence in the literature (Driffield and Hughes, 2003; 
Mullen and Williams, 2007; Jordaan, 2008a; Monastiriotis and Jordaan, 2010). In the 
linear model (col.1), the effect of foreign presence is non-significant but positive and 
statistically very different from the effect found for foreign presence at the national-
sectoral level (see col.1 in Table 1). This leads us to investigate the non-linearity of 
foreign ownership spillovers (col.2) which in the case of the national-sectoral variable 
were not significant (and thus not reported). Local-level spillovers appear now very 
strong statistically and hump-shaped. At its maximum (for concentrations near 36%), 
the estimated effect reaches a value of 0.073; and it only turns negative for 
concentrations above 71%, which concern just over 5% of observations in our sample.   
 
------- INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE ------- 
 
In col.3 of Table 2 we use this new evidence to return to the question of institutional 
proximity, separating again between foreign presence of EU15 and non-EU15 origin 
this time in a quadratic specification and measuring foreign presence within regions.10 
The results offer strong support to our hypothesis that presence of firms of EU15 origin 
has a distinctively different effect than presence of foreign firms from other parts of 
the world. As is depicted in Figure 2, the EU15 effect is hump-shaped and similar to 
that found for the total foreign-share variable, but it reaches a higher maximum value 
(0.923) at a higher level of concentration of foreign firms (46%) and only turns negative 
at concentrations over 93% that are found in less than 1% of our sample. In contrast, 
the effect of non-EU15 presence is statistically non-significant, U-shaped and always 
negative within the 0-100% range of foreign-ownership shares.  
                                                          
10
 We also examined this for the three sub-samples of CEE, SEE and ENP. The results were qualitatively 
very similar to those obtained for the foreign presence shares defined at the national-sectoral level 
(Table 1) and are thus not reported or discussed any further here.  
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------- INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE ------- 
 
In the remainder of Table 2 we test in turn our fourth hypothesis, about the 
differentiation of the spillovers across regions of different types. To do so, we 
introduce a dummy for firms located in capital-city regions and interact this with our 
foreign share variable(s). We do this both for the region-specific measure (col.4), so as 
to capture the effect from the concentration of foreign firms in the specific region 
where each firm is located; and for the nation-wide measure (col.5), to examine the 
same effect but this time for sectoral concentrations of foreign presence anywhere in 
the country. From the results it is clear that capital-city regions are less negatively 
affected by foreign ownership spillovers than other regions. For the latter, the effect is 
always negative and statistically significant.11 For capital-city regions the interaction 
effect with foreign presence at the local level is instead positive and statistically 
significant. Moreover, it is larger in absolute value than the level effect, suggesting that 
this type of regions enjoy positive productivity spillovers from foreign presence. 
This, then, provides confirmation for our last hypothesis (H4), showing not only that 
positive spillovers are linked specifically with localisation but also that they accrue 
mainly – if not exclusively – to firms located in capital-city regions. In line with our 
earlier discussion, we interpret this as suggesting that spillovers are greater (more 
positive) in areas of high agglomeration and economic development. This is consistent 
with evidence and arguments found both in the literature examining the localisation 
and regional differentiation of spillovers (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Sgrad, 2001; 
Monastiriotis and Jordaan, 2010) and in the wider literature that identifies 
                                                          
11
 Note that the difference in the two estimates suggests also the presence of negative spatial spillovers, 
as concentration at the national level (col.5) is found to produce a more negative effect than 
concentration locally (col.4). This is at variance with the findings in some of the spatial spillovers 
literature (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2008b) but in line with the results of Monastiriotis and 
Jordaan (2010) for the case of Greece. Negative spatial spillovers are also implied in the case of capital-
city regions, as the effect of col.5 is again smaller than that of col.4 and not significant statistically. 
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development and absorptive capacity as key intervening variables (Jordaan, 2005; 
Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Zhang et al, 2010; Chen et al, 2011; Farole and Winkler, 2012). 
To sum up, our empirical investigation has found evidence that is broadly in line with 
all four of our hypotheses. Foreign-firm presence is not universally beneficial. Rather, 
positive spillovers (when they exist) are mostly associated with concentrations of firms 
of EU15 origin and accrue mainly to firms located in capital-city regions and probably 
in countries with stronger forms of association with the EU (on the basis of the 
comparison between the SEE and ENP results). Moreover, positive spillovers appear to 
be rather localised (geographically concentrated) and concern medium-to-high 
sectoral concentrations (due to the non-linearity found in col.3 of Table 2). We discuss 
the implication of these findings in the concluding section.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The literature on the intra-industry productivity spillovers of foreign firm ownership 
has produced a large body of empirical evidence on the nature of these spillovers and 
the range of factors that condition them. Despite this, only a limited number of studies 
exist that examine the issue of the origin of the foreign investor as one of the 
mediating factors determining the size and direction of spillovers. Similarly, and 
despite the theoretical origins of this literature in the broader literatures of knowledge 
spillovers and agglomeration economies, studies that examine the geographical scale 
and spatial differentiation of these productivity spillovers are scarce.  
Taking on these observations, this paper sought to examine the role that a particular 
origin-related factor, namely institutional proximity between the sending and receiving 
countries, may play for the size and geography of such spillovers. Our hypothesis is 
that processes of EU association create an environment of deepening economic 
relations and institutional convergence which not only favours European investments 
in the associated countries but also creates the scope for larger productivity spillovers 
to accrue domestically – especially so in the more developed capital-city regions.  
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Our results support this hypothesis. Whereas, in line with the majority of findings in 
the literature, the estimated intra-industry spillovers are globally non-positive (Table 1, 
col.1), concentration of European-owned firms is associated with greater productivity 
spillovers for domestic firms – especially so when measured at the local level. 
Moreover, the size of this effect seems to be at least to an extent related to the 
intensity of the process of political-institutional approximation. In particular, 
comparing between the SEE and ENP regions where foreign capital deepening is still 
below potential, we find that – for all but the highest sectoral concentrations of 
foreign ownership – spillovers are strongest in the SEE region, where the process of 
association is more advanced and the prospect of accession clearer, and weakest in 
the ENP region, where association is looser and there is no clear prospect of accession.  
It is of course possible that other factors, rather than institutional approximation, may 
be driving these results – for example, differences in levels of development among the 
recipient countries, differences between EU15 and non-EU15 firms in a range of 
characteristics (degree of ownership; degree of concentration within sectors; 
technological content and capital intensity; sectoral composition), or indeed 
differences among recipient countries in their composition of EU15 country-origins. In 
our analysis we tried to control for some of these possible effects (e.g., the use of 
time-varying country fixed effects eliminates the influence of national-level 
characteristics such as level of development or geographical distance), but we were of 
course unable to control for all possible influences. In this sense, the results presented 
here should be read with caution and treated only as an indication, than as a proof, of 
the existence of a positive ‘institutional proximity’ effect. Separately, it should be kept 
in mind that the obtained results concern only the case of intra-industry spillovers. It is 
possible that patterns of inter-industry spillovers will be different and indeed the 
institutional proximity effect, if it exists, may even go in the opposite direction – as has 
been shown to be the case with the geographical proximity effect (Javorcik and 
Spatareanou, 2011).  
Besides these issues, our further exploration of the geography of spillovers has 
unveiled another interesting dimension to the issue of institutional proximity. The 
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effects of foreign presence, especially for EU15 firms, are rather localised and 
significantly more beneficial for capital-city regions than for other regions in each 
country. This effect is not present for non-EU15 firms but it is very strong in the case of 
EU15 firms, resulting in positive net spillovers in capital-city regions and net negative 
spillovers in all other regions. As capital-city regions are typically the most developed 
within each national economy, this means that EU15 spillovers act to amplify existing 
regional disparities in the recipient countries.12  
This ultimately suggests the presence of a crucial trade-off between, on the one hand, 
higher productivity spillovers accruing from the inflow of EU-originating investments 
within the process of EU association and, on the other hand, higher regional disparities 
resulting from the spatial selectivity of these spillovers. This in turn has strong 
implications for the scope and design of EU association policies. As the ‘gravitation 
pull’ of the EU makes deeper association almost inevitable for the countries in the EU 
neighbourhood, the EU shares in a way a responsibility to address the adverse 
consequences generated by the processes of approximation and integration – 
including the spatial imbalances found here. Association policies should thus have a 
clear geographical dimension, seeking to develop and support actions that compensate 
for the spatial imbalances that EU association and economic openness may bring 
about. Recent policy developments, both in the SEE region (e.g., the opening of the 
‘regional development’ component of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance to 
all beneficiary countries) and in the ENP (e.g., the initiation of a ‘regional policy 
dialogue’ and the inclusion of an ‘inter-regional programme’ within the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), are partly in this direction. Future policy 
should aim at strengthening the technological content and absorptive capacity of firms 
located in peripheral regions so as to enable them to share the gains from the 
increasing foreign-firm presence in their sectors and regions. 
                                                          
12
 It is still possible, of course, that concentration of foreign/EU15 firms in capital-city regions creates 
positive spatial spillovers to other regions – as has been shown, for example, by Jordaan (2005) for the 
case of Mexico. Although we could not formally test for this, we note that the evidence obtained in the 
last two columns of Table 2 goes against this possibility. In any case, for spatial spillovers to contribute 
towards declining regional disparities, these spillovers would have to be larger than the local-level 
effects – a condition which is both intuitively and empirically rather unlikely.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Details on the dataset 
The main data used in this paper come from the Panel II-IV version of the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). BEEPS is an enterprise-level survey 
implemented jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank. The survey enquires individual firms 
across 28 transition countries (see Table A.1 for a list of countries) in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia about their business and business environment and contains information on a 
number of firm data, including sales, employment, fixed assets, share of foreign ownership, 
share of exports, sector (NACE two-digit classification), country and region where the firm is 
located and origin of foreign investor (if any). The Panel II-IV version of BEEPS is an unbalanced 
panel containing approximately 28,000 observations from three waves – 2002, 2005 and 2009 
– with additional information form an intermediate wave conducted in a sub-set of countries 
in 2007. Turkey and Montenegro are not covered in the 2002 wave while Azerbaijan was not 
included in the 2005 wave. Some problems concerning the currency at which monetary values 
are reported in this dataset were identified and corrected in the November 2013 version. Full 
details about the dataset are available at http://ebrd-beeps.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/beeps_panel_020509r.pdf.  
Monetary values in this revised dataset have been converted by the survey team in current US 
dollars for the 2002 and 2005 waves but are reported in current local currency units for 
subsequent waves. Thus, in processing the survey data we first converted all local-currency 
data into current US dollars and subsequently deflated them and expressed them in constant 
2005 US dollars (using data from IMF’s IFS database).  
The Panel II-IV dataset has some gaps concerning some key variables of interest in this paper, 
namely the share and nationality of foreign presence and the region and sector of economic 
activity. Where possible, we filled these gaps by projecting the values available in previous 
years or in the cross-sectional editions of BEEPS. This assumes that the region, sector, or share 
of foreign ownership has not changed between two survey years. Gaps and missing 
information also concerns the data on employment and capital (fixed assets). In the case of 
data gaps (i.e., information available for a firm in one wave but not in another) we interpolated 
(or extrapolated) the missing data, using data from the available years and adjusting for the 
missing years assuming that the change in the aggregate of interest (employment or fixed 
assets) for any particular firm with missing data was proportionately the same as with the 
region-sector to which this firm belonged. This affected 61 observations for the employment 
variable and 323 observations for the capital variable and has no influence on the obtained 
results. 
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Besides this, a large number of missing values exist for the case of information on fixed assets 
(questions 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b in the BEEPS). This caused a sample-size reduction of some 12,000 
observations out of the 22,009 observations for which data on all other variables of interest 
were available. We have checked whether non-reporting of fixed-assets information varies 
systematically across different concentrations of foreign-ownership, but found no evidence for 
this. Given this, and given the importance of controlling for firms’ capital when estimating 
productivity spillovers, we decided to work with the smaller sample. An additional factor for 
this was that we considered availability of information of fixed assets to be also an indicator of 
data quality more generally also for the other variables. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 below report some key features of the data (long dataset) along the main 
dimensions of interest (distribution across countries and sectors and sectoral and national 
shares of foreign ownership, both total and EU15). As can be seen there, sample sizes vary 
notably across countries, with only 82 observations in Montenegro and between 1,000 and 
1,600 observations in Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Kazakhstan and 
Croatia. The main sectors where firms are located are Food, Retail trade, Wholesale trade, 
Construction and Other services. The sectoral distribution of foreign-owned firms follows a 
similar pattern, although with some exceptions (e.g., foreign firms are significantly over-
represented in the IT sectors). Higher shares of foreign firm presence are found in the CEE 
sample (especially Latvia and Hungary) while differences between the SEE and ENP samples 
are not too large.   
Firms of EU15 origin have a stronger presence in sectors such as Computer & consultancy, 
Telecommunications, Other services, Transport, Wholesale trade, Machinery and equipment, 
Non-metallic mineral products, and Garments; while they have a disproportionately low 
presence in Electronics, IT, Retail trade, as well as in Basic metals, Chemicals and Textiles. They 
are also over-represented, relative to non-EU15 firms, in the CEE sample and less so in the SEE 
sample.    
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Table A.1. Sample size and foreign ownership shares by country and region 
Country Domestic firms Foreign firms EU15 firms 
 
No of obs, 
all years 
Firms in more 
than one wave 
No of firms*  % sales‡ % sales‡ 
CEE 
 
 
  
 
Bulgaria 1,423 311 205 27.8% 12.2% 
Czech Rep. 556 92 84 28.2% 27.3% 
Estonia 512 240 116 32.9% 25.7% 
Hungary 777 207 180 33.5% 23.3% 
Latvia 481 193 100 36.1% 27.4% 
Lithuania 540 175 75 20.3% 16.0% 
Poland 1,249 253 136 14.2% 11.5% 
Romania 940 253 149 14.8% 10.5% 
Slovakia 418 101 70 18.4% 14.1% 
Slovenia 575 231 79 18.8% 17.8% 
SEE 
 
 
  
 
Albania 437 123 70 18.2% 14.8% 
Bosnia 461 80 54 8.5% 4.7% 
Croatia 897 165 116 14.7% 11.1% 
FYROM 429 157 64 20.3% 15.2% 
Montenegro 77 3 5 8.0% 6.0% 
Serbia 532 204 78 25.2% 19.8% 
Turkey 1,165 625 38 4.5% 2.6% 
ENP 
 
 
  
 
Armenia 638 231 65 12.8% 6.0% 
Azerbaijan 393 142 51 22.5% 15.7% 
Belarus 558 182 100 9.1% 4.9% 
Georgia 493 186 59 15.0% 5.8% 
Kazakhstan 962 217 91 10.3% 1.7% 
Kyrgyz 378 162 78 17.2% 7.9% 
Moldova 638 260 88 20.2% 5.6% 
Russia 1,328 138 115 7.8% 1.9% 
Tajikistan 550 140 51 10.8% 7.6% 
Ukraine 1,061 399 379 21.5% 10.0% 
Uzbekistan 711 246 134 13.4% 4.1% 
Total 19,179 5,716 2,830 17.9% 11.5% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the BEEPS Panel II-IV.  
*: Firms with a foreign ownership share of at least 10%. ‡: Sales of all firms multiplied by each 
firm’s share of foreign ownership as a share of total sales (all firms).  
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Table A.2. Sample size and foreign ownership shares by sector of economic activity 
 
Domestic firms Foreign firms EU15-owned firms 
Sector 
Number of 
firms 
Sectoral 
share 
Number of 
firms 
Sectoral 
share 
Share in  
the sector 
Number of 
firms 
Sectoral 
share 
Share in  
the sector 
Share to 
foreign in 
the sector  
Basic metals    94  0.5% 15 0.5% 14% 2 0.3% 2% 13% 
Chemicals     310  1.6% 70 2.5% 18% 12 1.5% 3% 17% 
Computer programming, consulting, etc -    0.0% 3 0.1% 100% 2 0.3% 67% 67% 
Construction   2,041  10.6% 164 5.8% 7% 38 4.8% 2% 23% 
Electronics   162  0.8% 31 1.1% 16% 2 0.3% 1% 6% 
Fabricate metal products   930  4.8% 109 3.9% 10% 29 3.6% 3% 27% 
Food     2,527  13.2% 521 18.4% 17% 152 19.1% 5% 29% 
Garments     1,009  5.3% 113 4.0% 10% 34 4.3% 3% 30% 
Hotel and restaurants: section H 823  4.3% 122 4.3% 13% 35 4.4% 4% 29% 
IT     240  1.3% 71 2.5% 23% 6 0.8% 2% 8% 
Machinery and equipment   687  3.6% 112 4.0% 14% 36 4.5% 5% 32% 
Non-metallic mineral products  345  1.8% 51 1.8% 13% 18 2.3% 5% 35% 
Other manufacturing    1,246  6.5% 194 6.9% 13% 54 6.8% 4% 28% 
Other services    1,801  9.4% 240 8.5% 12% 105 13.2% 5% 44% 
Plastics & rubber   198  1.0% 38 1.3% 16% 9 1.1% 4% 24% 
Retail trade   3,072  16.0% 268 9.5% 8% 34 4.3% 1% 13% 
Telecommunications     2  0.0% 1 0.0% 33% 1 0.1% 33% 100% 
Textiles     406  2.1% 65 2.3% 14% 12 1.5% 3% 18% 
Transport  1,085  5.7% 176 6.2% 14% 54 6.8% 4% 31% 
Wholesale trade     2,201  11.5% 466 16.5% 17% 161 20.2% 6% 35% 
Total 19,179  100.0% 2,830  100.0% 13% 796 100.0% 4% 28% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the BEEPS Panel II-IV.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Impact of foreign ownership by region of origin and destination  
Dependent: ln(sales) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ALL ALL CEE SEE ENP CEE SEE ENP 
Employment 0.852*** 0.852*** 0.876*** 0.757*** 0.880*** 0.876*** 0.758*** 0.880*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.041) (0.023) (0.010) (0.041) (0.023) 
Fixed assets 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.166*** 0.231*** 0.174*** 0.167*** 0.230*** 0.174*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.043) (0.018) (0.014) (0.043) (0.018) 
Foreign share -0.123** 
       
(0.055) 
       
EU15 share 
 
-0.00177 0.00452 0.0524 0.140 0.303 0.914** 0.175 
 
(0.048) (0.079) (0.090) (0.182) (0.314) (0.342) (0.500) 
EU15 share squared      -0.484 -1.428*** -0.0508 
     (0.412) (0.440) (0.860) 
Non-EU15 share 
 
-0.293*** -0.214 -0.269 -0.411 0.116 -1.498*** -0.542 
 
(0.092) (0.166) (0.215) (0.265) (0.335) (0.508) (0.636) 
Non-EU15 share squared 
     
-0.624 2.031** 0.213 
     
(0.406) (0.814) (0.643) 
Constant 7.132*** 7.107*** 8.067*** 6.804*** 6.712*** 8.024*** 6.713*** 6.709*** 
 (0.266) (0.271) (0.161) (0.492) (0.222) (0.170) (0.470) (0.222) 
Observations 9,292 9,292 4,225 2,024 3,043 4,225 2,024 3,043 
R-squared 0.825 0.825 0.856 0.769 0.786 0.856 0.770 0.786 
Wald-tests for joint significance         
EU15 terms      0.93 7.91*** 0.41 
Non-EU15 terms      4.57** 4.46** 8.66*** 
F-test for equality of EU15 and non-EU15 effects  8.15*** 1.71 1.07 4.66**    
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. All regressions include sector dummies and interacted 
year-country fixed effects.  
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Figure 1. Estimated foreign ownership spillovers by region of origin and destination  
 
(a) EU ownership     (b) Non-EU ownership 
Note: Estimated total effects of foreign ownership (sectoral share of foreign-owned firms) on domestic 
firms’ productivity (vertical axis) across different shares of foreign concentration (horizontal axis), by 
origin of foreign investors and region of destination – derived from cols 6-8 of Table 1.  
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Table 2. Localisation and regional differentiation of the impact of foreign ownership  
Foreign-share 
measure: 
Localised (region-sector) 
Nationwide 
(sector) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employment 0.853*** 0.853*** 0.853*** 0.831*** 0.831*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.00834) (0.00834) 
Fixed assets 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.00652) (0.00652) 
Capital region    0.107*** 0.124*** 
    (0.0258) (0.0278) 
Foreign share 0.0154 0.409***  -0.136** -0.227*** 
(0.064) (0.114)  (0.0613) (0.0614) 
       “ “ squared 
 
-0.574***    
 
(0.139)    
      … (x) capital     0.246** 0.0788 
    (0.0998) (0.101) 
EU15 share   0.399**   
   (0.189)   
       “ “ squared   -0.431*   
  (0.222)   
Non-EU15 share 
  
-0.205   
  
(0.219)   
       “ “ squared 
  
0.109   
  
(0.275)   
Constant 7.092*** 7.065*** 7.060*** 7.413*** 7.430*** 
(0.280) (0.277) (0.276) (0.112) (0.112) 
Observations 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 9,292 
R-squared 0.825 0.826 0.825 0.809 0.809 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. All regressions include sector dummies and interacted year-country fixed effects.  
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Figure 2. Localised foreign ownership spillovers by region of origin  
 
Note: Estimated total effects of foreign ownership on domestic firms’ productivity (vertical axis) across 
different shares of foreign concentration (horizontal axis), by origin of foreign investors – derived from 
cols 2-3 of Table 2.  
 
 
